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(with Malcolm Forster) " How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, 45:1-36. (with Martin Barrett) " The Second Law of Probability Dynamics." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, 45: 941-954. Savitt (ed.), Time's Arrow Today, 1995, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. (with Martin Barrett) " When and Why Does Entropy Increase?." In S.

" Black Box Inference: When Should an Intervening Variable be Postulated? " British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1998, 49: 469-498. Of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Proceedings of the 20 th World Congress of Philosophy ,

" Instrumentalism Revisited." Critica, 1999, 31: 3-38 short version in Proceedings " To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory." Synthese, 1998, 115: 355-373. " Addendum" (to "To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory"). " The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism." Philosophy of Science, 1999, 66: 542-564. " Testability." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1999, 73: 47-76. " Quine's Two Dogmas." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2000, 74: 237-280. " Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2001, 52: 331-346. Swinburne (ed.), Bayes' Theorem, 2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. " Bayesianism-Its Scope and Limits." in R. (with Mehmet Elgin) " Cartwright on Explanation and Idealization." Erkenntnis, 2002, 57: 441-450. " Instrumentalism, Parsimony, and the Akaike Framework." Philosophy of Science, 2002, 69: S112-S123. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism, 2003, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. McAleer (eds.), Simplicity, Inference, and Modelling, 2002, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. " What is the Problem of Simplicity?." In A. " An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument: Gott's Line and Leslie's Wedge. " Likelihood, Model Selection, and the Duhem-Quine Problem." Journal of Philosophy, 2004, 101: 1-22. (with Christopher Hitchcock) " Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2004, 55: 1-34. Lee (eds.), The Nature of Scientific Evidence, 2004, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. (with Malcolm Forster) " Why Likelihood?." In M. Sarkar (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, 2006, New York: Routledge, pp. Wylie (eds.), Value-Free Science: Ideal or Illusion?, 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, 2008, New York: Routledge, pp. " Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-tuning, and Firing squads." Philosophical Studies, 2009, 143: 63-90. " Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 2009, 83(2): 117-155. " Parsimony Arguments in Science and Philosophy-A Test Case for Naturalism p. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006), 2010, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. " Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities." In E. (with Mehmet Elgin) " Causal, A Priori True, and Explanatory: A Reply to Lange and Rosenberg." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 93: 167-171. Bandyopadhyay (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7), 2011, Oxford: Elsevier, pp. (with Malcolm Forster) " AIC Scores as Evidence: A Bayesian Interpretation." In M. " Why Philosophy of Science Matters to Science Education." A paper commissioned by the National Academies of Science NRC Board on Science Education (Committee on the Status, Contributions, and Future Directions of Discipline Based Education Research). (with Jordan Ellenberg) " Objective Probabilities in Number Theory." Philosophia Mathematica, 2011, 19: 308-322. " Reichenbach's Cube and the Problem of the External World." Synthese, 2011, 181: 3-21. (with Larry Shapiro) " Against Proportionality." Analysis, 2012, 72(1): 89-93. " Coincidences and How to Reason about Them." European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, 2012, 1: 355-374. (with William Roche) " Explanatoriness is Evidentially Irrelevant, or Inference to the Best Explanation Meets Bayesian Confirmation Theory." Analysis, 2013, 73: 659-668. (with Mike Steel) " Screening-Off and Causal Incompleteness: A No-Go Theorem." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2012, 64(3): 513-550. " Two Cornell Realisms: Moral and Scientific.